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Abstract 
Confidence in perceptual decisions is a baseline for quantitatively measuring metacognitive 
processes in psychology. Most researchers limit the stimulus to two choices, assuming that the 
mental process summarizes the likely accuracy of all choices to determine confidence in the 
decision. The purpose of this study was to determine whether multiple alternative choices, with 
varying levels of information strength for each choice, follow the same mental statistics as 
similar two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) tasks. If the differences between information 
strengths for each of the multiple choices had a direct effect on confidence, then presenting 
higher and lower differences of information strength between the correct choice and the incorrect 
choice would result in corresponding higher and lower confidence ratings. Participants were 
shown multicolor clouds of dots made up of three colors, with one dot color (dominant) being 
more abundant than the others. Participants decided which color was the dominant color for each 
cloud, then indicated their confidence in that decision. The overall information strength, 
dominant-secondary strength difference, and dominant-tertiary strength difference all had 
significant main effects on both confidence and accuracy. The overall strength had the largest 
effect size for confidence, with more information strength resulting in higher confidence ratings. 
The dominant-secondary strength difference had the largest effect size for accuracy, with a larger 
difference between dominant and secondary color strengths resulting in higher accuracy rates. 
Further investigation on how the brain defines relevant stimuli in an environment and processing 
of multiple choices must be conducted before developing computational models for confidence. 
Keywords: metacognition, decision making, confidence, perceptual decisions, 2AFC, 
uncertainty  
DocuSign Envelope ID: 3450C2E7-FD23-4551-B69A-3AA841B6FE25
MULTIPLE-ALTERNATIVES ON CONFIDENCE-DECISION TASKS                       
5 
Introduction 
 Perceptual decision making is the process of using sensory information from the 
environment to choose and act upon one option from a list of possible alternative options. 
Confidence in these perceptual decisions involves the self-evaluation of that decision’s quality to 
redirect future choices to be of equal or higher quality. This confidence in perceptual decision 
making drives vital interactions in society, but lack of understanding of the mechanism for these 
processes leads to severe negative consequences. For example, business stock analysis requires 
high-stakes perceptual decisions to be made regularly. In large businesses, complex perceptual 
decisions that involve interpreting large fluctuations in stock investments often lead to 
employees expecting a change too extreme in value because of the high volatility (Zylberberg et 
al., 2016). When professional stock analysts overreact in predicting poor earnings forecasts, 
stock prices often drop dramatically and result in severe investment losses (De Bondt & Thaler, 
1990). While the role of overreaction to highly volatile stimuli is understood, the exact 
mechanism of how sensory information modulates the confidence process is not well developed 
in psychological literature. 
Computational models of the confidence process in decision making need further 
development to increase external validity and be applicable to perceptual scenarios beyond the 
laboratory environment. The current literature is limited by study designs varying the strength of 
sensory information over only two possible choices. In this design, participants are presented 
with a perceptual task where a stimulus is more accurately one choice over another, like more 
left than right or more blue than red (Samaha et al., 2016; Boldt et al., 2017). The participants 
decide which choice was correct, and then rate their confidence in that decision. Most 
researchers in the field argue that the best basis for modeling this confidence data is in Bayesian 
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posterior probability distributions (Zylberberg et al., 2014; Sanders et al., 2016; Meyniel et al., 
2015). The Bayesian basis suggests that human confidence is processed by computing the joint 
probability of potential decisions within a given environment. With an additional shift 
accounting for human error, this mental computation would follow the statistical computation 
exactly.  
However, the given environments for these studies pose a modeling issue. The 
researchers proposing this confidence model limit the decision choices to two alternatives and 
have not explored what occurs when more alternatives are added (Zylberberg et al., 2014; 
Sanders et al., 2016; Meyniel et al., 2015). According to a cognitive study by Li and Ma, this 
Bayesian distribution of confidence only applies to the two-choice decision making tasks, and 
adding a third alternative for decision making disrupts this distribution so that it does not model 
confidence data (2020). They suggested that confidence was not based on the holistic probability 
of an event, as suggested by Bayesian model researchers, nor was it based on the individual 
probability of any alternative choice. Instead, confidence would theoretically be represented by 
the differential probability of an event, where the difference between the two highest choices is 
used to determine confidence. As reality often presents stimuli in multiple alternatives for 
humans to make perceptual decisions on, this differential probability model must be tested for 
confidence in perceptual decision making tasks. 
In this study, we will present multiple-alternative perceptual decision making tasks to 
participants and explore components for future computational models to understand how the 
confidence process works with additional alternative choices introduced. We predict modeling 
confidence in perceptual decision making with increasingly complex behavioral scenarios would 
increase our knowledge of human confidence in terms that can be actively applied to both 
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stronger neuroimaging models of confidence as well as stronger training programs that increase 
quality decisions in high-stakes perceptual scenarios. 
Literature Review 
Differences Between Confidence and Perceptual Decision Making 
Confidence about decisions involves subjective evaluation of the quality of the decisions 
to redirect future decisions (Boldt et al., 2017). The difficulty in defining confidence 
quantitatively comes from analyzing a subjective evaluation accurately, distinguishing the 
metacognition of this evaluation from the quality of the decision itself, and ensuring the 
experiment can be applied to the real world with high external validity (Zylberberg et al., 2016; 
Spence et al., 2018; Boldt et al., 2017).  
Researchers in the field typically look to address at least one of these issues in each 
research study. The accuracy of confidence analysis tends to be addressed by creating a 
computational model that collects stimulus and decision inputs to correctly predict the resulting 
confidence rating from the participants (Kiani et al., 2014; Li & Ma, 2020; Zylberberg et al., 
2016). The difference between confidence and the decision quality itself has often been 
distinguished through varying the amount of perceptual information presented to participants and 
determining the difference between confidence levels and decision accuracy (Desender et al., 
2018; Spence et al., 2018; Vlassova et al., 2014).  
Having a high external validity within the experimental design, however, is not often 
considered in most studies. Many researchers use the common two-alternative forced-choice 
(2AFC) tasks that simplify decisions to distinguish between two choices, such as yes-no or left-
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right (Boldt et al., 2017; Desender et al., 2018; Sanders et al., 2016). Few researchers have 
questioned whether presenting additional alternatives would invalidate the models created from 
the results of 2AFC tasks when applying the model to the real world (Li & Ma, 2020), but these 
questions must be considered to effectively evaluate the metacognitive process of confidence in 
order both to determine the best methods of increasing quality decision making and human 
confidence as well as to discover the neural pathways responsible for confidence.  
Confidence Modeling: Bayesian Posterior Probability Distribution 
 The most commonly referenced model in the literature for representing confidence is the 
Bayesian posterior probability distribution. Zylberberg, Roelfsema, and Sigman used a Bayesian 
model to display the difference between inaccurate perception and confidence judgments by 
comparing the participant confidence reports to the standard error as dependent on internal 
evidence variance (2014). The model depends on differences in stimulus variance to determine 
differences in levels of confidence; however, the variance in the design was set up in categorical 
levels of low, medium, and high rather than a continuous scale of 0% to 100%. As the model 
only uses these three levels, it is impossible to determine whether any more complex 
relationships exist between stimulus variance and confidence at more ranges of variance and 
significantly limits the utility of this computational model.  
Unfortunately, most studies referencing Bayesian distributions as their model do not 
define their parameters even as specifically as Zylberberg and colleagues did in their 2014 study. 
Several studies just refer to the distribution as the mathematical approximation of confidence in 
human decision making without fitting the model to any data to ensure a good model fit (Boldt et 
al., 2017; Meyniel et al., 2015; Sanders et al., 2016). These studies do not add a quantitative 
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understanding of the confidence process but only continue to suggest a trend without any 
verification of computation. In short, most studies describing confidence as a Bayesian 
distribution do not create a testable and precise computational model for analyzing the 
metacognitive process of confidence. 
Information Strength 
While distinguishing between the decision making and confidence processes presents 
several design challenges for researchers, many studies found success in controlling for the 
strength of stimulus information used in the decision making process, like the degree of angle 
left or right. Spence, Mattingley, and Dux were able to find distinguishing relationships for 
decision accuracy and confidence, where accuracy did not change significantly over 
informational strength while confidence significantly decreased with decreasing informational 
strength (2018). In this study, two stimuli were presented, and researchers asked questions about 
the brightness or direction after viewing both stimuli. By increasing the direction variability, and 
therefore decreasing information strength about direction, researchers observed that participants 
rated lower confidence in brightness decisions without decreasing accuracy of brightness 
decisions.  
In another study, Zylberberg, Fetsch, and Shadlen found that increasing noise, or 
increasing information strength of the irrelevant stimuli, would decrease accuracy to a small 
effect and increase confidence to larger effects in both human and monkey decision making 
(2016). Zylberberg’s 2016 study falls under the same criticism as his 2014 study in that the 
noise, the dependent variable upon which the conclusions depend, is reduced to an unnaturally 
categorical variable with the levels “low” and “high” rather than a continuous variable with a 
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wider range of observational power, suggesting the effects are weaker and should be reevaluated 
with a more precise experimental design. Limitations aside, both studies’ data suggest that there 
is a direct positive relationship between irrelevant stimuli and confidence, but do not suggest a 
relationship between relevant stimuli and confidence and can only prescribe a relationship 
between the ratio of relevant to irrelevant stimuli and confidence due to their experimental 
designs as 2AFC tasks in a two-dimensional design. 
Two-Alternative Forced Choice Task 
 The standard experimental design for perceptual decision making and confidence studies 
follows the 2AFC task design where participants make a decision between two choices from the 
perceptual stimulus and then rate their confidence about the decision made. In the Boldt, de 
Gardelle, and Yeung study in 2017, participants chose if the summary of colors presented had 
more red or more blue. In the Desender, Boldt, and Yeung study in 2018, participants followed 
the same procedures as the Boldt 2017 study by choosing between the colors being red or blue in 
summation, with the additional option of requesting further information in some trials. In the 
Meyniel, Sigman, and Mainen article, the authors describe the traditional design involved with 
motion perception decision making being summarized into motion vectors going either left or 
right, with varying degrees to the left or right (2015). Sanders, Hangya, and Kepecs presented 
participants with an audible stimulus in both the left and right ear and had participants choose on 
which side the stimulus was playing faster (2016). Even in Spence, Dux, and Arnold’s 2016 
study, which involved 10 direction conditions with 4 ranges of variance, the participant choice 
was still a summation of whether the direction was moving towards the left or the right of center. 
Most studies introduce complexity into the task with variance in information strength and 
conditions, but participants ultimately only have two options to choose between.  
DocuSign Envelope ID: 3450C2E7-FD23-4551-B69A-3AA841B6FE25
MULTIPLE-ALTERNATIVES ON CONFIDENCE-DECISION TASKS                       
11 
Li and Ma critiqued this design in their 2020 article by creating a study where three 
alternative choices are presented in response to their cognitive stimulus in order to develop a 
confidence model from three different options rather than the typical two options. In their model, 
they suggest that confidence is not determined by the participant making the most correct choice 
out of all options, but by participants subjectively making the best choice out of the two options 
they see as most likely. The difference-based model, based on the best two choices, better fit the 
data than a corresponding Bayesian distribution model, based on all presented choices. While Li 
and Ma’s study used a cognitive task instead of a perceptual task, their conclusion has strong 
implications for the 2AFC dominated perceptual decision field. As no perceptual studies have 
addressed this question, research must be done to fill this gap in scientific knowledge, expand the 
understanding of the process of confidence, and validate the application of this understanding to 
the external world. 
Current Study 
 The current study will address the limitations in confidence modeling, information 
strength, and multi-choice experimental designs by investigating components of confidence in 
perceptual decision-making. Using a three-alternative forced choice design with twelve 
conditions of information strength, this study will collect and represent the data that future 
computational models of confidence should fit. This study will provide a more conclusive 
perspective of the effects that multiple-alternatives and varying information strength have on 
confidence in perceptual decision-making tasks. 
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 Students from the Georgia Institute of Technology (n = 15) between the ages of 18 and 
40 were recruited to participate in this study at the Center for Advanced Brain Imaging via the 
Georgia Tech SONA psychology experiment scheduling system. The exclusionary criteria for 
the study required participants to be able to distinguish between different colors and complete 
both sessions of the study; there were three participants who completed only one session, so their 
data were excluded from this study. The sample was made up of 15 Georgia Tech students (8 
females) aged 18 to 21 years old with an average age of 19.3 with normal (n = 11) or corrected-
to-normal (n = 4) vision. Consent was approved according to guidelines from the Georgia Tech 
Institutional Review Board, and the experiment began after participants completed the consent 
forms. For their participation, students received one SONA course credit per hour for a total of 
two course credits.  
Design 
 This experimental study manipulated the information strength of three visual stimuli in a 
decision-making task to determine the effect on perceptual accuracy and confidence. There were 
three levels of color: dominant, secondary, and tertiary. Dominant had the greatest abundance of 
dots on-screen, while secondary had fewer dots and tertiary had the fewest number of dots. There 
were twelve conditions based on information strength for each color level with manipulations on 
the difference in strength between each level, as demonstrated in Figure 1 below.  
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Figure 1.  
Conditions for Information Strength Differences at Each Color Level 
 
Note. C1-C12 demonstrates the twelve conditions of the experiment and their 
corresponding information strength of the dominant, secondary, and tertiary color. This 
information strength is specifically represented by the number of dots of that color on 
screen. For example, C5 would have 100 dots of the dominant color, 64 dots of the 
secondary color, and 48 dots of the tertiary color. These differences between color levels 
should demonstrate the relationship of three stimulus choices and their information 
strengths on confidence in perceptual decision-making tasks. It should be noted that the 
first six conditions (C1-C6) have more dots overall than the last six conditions (C7-C12). 
This is designed to distinguish the effects of overall information strength presented in a 
stimulus from the effects of color level information strength in a task. 
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The information strength was defined by the number of dots. Overall, this was represented by the 
number of dots visible on the screen during a given period, so high overall information strength 
would have more dots present like in condition C1. This strength was also represented for each 
color level, where high level information strength in a level had more dots present than a 
condition with a low-level information strength on the same level, like conditions C2 and C5.  
 Accuracy was defined by whether the participant’s response was correct or incorrect for 
each trial. Confidence was defined by a Likert scale response of 1 to 4, with 1 being low and 4 
being high. The study is a within-groups design, so each participant is presented with all twelve 
conditions throughout the experiment at a randomized order.  
The experimental apparatus for the study used an individual testing room for each 
participant with a Mac computer, a PC keyboard, and a wired mouse. For the experiment, the 
lights in the room were turned off. A MATLAB (version x.)  computer program designed by the 
lab was used for training, stimulus, and recording responses.  
Procedure 
Training 
 Before beginning the experiment, participants were instructed on the task through a script 
following the signing of the informed consent document. Once the participants indicated they 
understood what task they would be completing, the participants were led into the testing booth 
and completed the training section. 
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The training section presented participants with a multicolor cloud of dots. Each dot was 
colored red, green, or blue. One dot color was dominant, as defined as the color having more 
dots in the cloud than the other colors. The participant in the study indicated which color was the 
dominant color. Afterwards, the participant would indicate their level of confidence using a 1-4 
scale, where 1 is the lowest confidence and 4 is the highest.  
For the first three sections of training, the participants received feedback after the 
confidence rating on whether the color choice was correct or incorrect. For the first section, the 
cloud stimulus was presented for 3 seconds. Each training section shortened the duration of the 
stimulus, such that the duration of the second section was 1.5 seconds, and the third section was 
0.5 seconds. After the first section, participants were reminded to fix their eyes on the white 
fixation dot in the center of the screen. After the second section, participants were reminded to 
use the whole scale for confidence ratings. For the fourth training section, participants practiced 
without feedback with stimulus presented for 0.5 seconds. 
Experiment 
Participants then completed the experimental section following the same procedures from 
the fourth training section. Participants completed 3 runs per session with 5 blocks per run. Each 
block had 48 trials. Each participant completed 720 trials per session. There was a 15-second 
break between each block, and participants chose how much time to take for a break between 
runs. This process took about an hour to complete and was completed twice for two sessions per 
participant. The second session was completed on another day within a week of the first session 
and included both a training and experimental section. Each participant completed 1440 
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experimental trials overall. Over 30 participants, this resulted in 21600 experimental trials, with 
1800 trials for each of the 12 conditions. 
Data Analysis 
If the amount of overall information strength presented in a stimulus has a direct effect on 
confidence, then presenting a high and low level of overall information strength to participants 
will result in corresponding high and low confidence ratings. However, if the differences 
between information strength for each of the three stimuli choices also have a direct effect on 
confidence, then presenting higher and lower differences of information strength between the 
correct choice and the incorrect choices will result in corresponding higher and lower confidence 
ratings. 
We tested four statistical hypotheses in this study involving stimulus strength and 
confidence ratings. The first hypothesis was that increased overall strength of the stimulus would 
cause increased confidence ratings. The second hypothesis was that increased difference between 
dominant color strength and secondary color strength would cause increased confidence ratings. 
The third hypothesis was that increased difference between dominant color strength and tertiary 
color strength would cause increased confidence ratings. The fourth hypothesis was that the 
overall strength, the difference between dominant and secondary color strength, and the 
difference between dominant and tertiary color strength would interact to modulate the 
confidence ratings so that higher levels of each variable would cause higher confidence ratings.  
In order to test the four hypotheses, we conducted a 2 x 2 x 3 within-group repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) because we had three categorical independent variables 
and one continuous dependent variable. The independent variables were the overall strength of 
stimulus (two levels: low or high), the difference between dominant and secondary color strength 
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(two levels: low or high), and the difference between dominant and tertiary color strength (three 
levels: low, medium, or high). The dependent variable was the confidence rating on a Likert 
scale of 1 to 4. This 3-Way ANOVA allowed us to analyze the main effect of overall stimulus 
strength on confidence (Hypothesis 1), of the difference between dominant and secondary color 
strength on confidence (Hypothesis 2), of the difference between dominant and tertiary color 
strength on confidence (Hypothesis 3), and of the interactive effects of overall stimulus strength, 





The mean confidence rating across participants (M = 2.5695, SD = 0.9926) was normally 
distributed, suggesting there were no outliers in confidence scores. Using a two-sample t-test to 
determine gender differences, we found that the confidence ratings of female participants (M = 
2.4093, SD = 0.1231) were not significantly different compared to that of male participants (M = 
2.4228, SD = 0.0839), t(13)=-0.2450, p = 0.8103. Using another two-sample t-test to determine 
vision differences, we found that the confidence ratings of normal vision participants (M = 
2.4029, SD = 0.0840) were not significant different compared to that of corrected-to-normal 
vision participants (M = 2.4504, SD = 0.1547), t(13)=-0.7769, p = 0.4511. Using a one-way 
ANOVA, there were no statistically significant difference between confidence ratings of the 
three colors red (M= 2.4311, SD = 0.1342), green (M= 2.4409, SD = 0.0820), and blue (M= 
2.3749, SD = 0.1052), F(2,42) = 1.5960, p = 0.2147. Using another one-way ANOVA, there was 
a statistically significant difference between accuracy rates for the three colors red (M= 0.7429, 
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SD = 0.0262), green (M= 0.7944, SD = 0.0277), and blue (M= 0.6430, SD = 0.0402), F(2,42) = 
86.95, p = 0.000. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Four statistical hypotheses were tested in this study to determine the effects of stimulus 
strength on confidence ratings in the perceptual decision-making task. With the ANOVA ran to 
determine effect size and significance, Mauchly's Test of Sphericity indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(65) = 231.54, p < .0005 and χ2(65) = 248.71, p < 
.0005; therefore, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used on each of the hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis was that the increased overall strength of the stimulus would cause 
increased confidence ratings. There was a significant main effect of the level of the overall 
strength of the stimulus on the confidence rating, F(1,14) = 3133.6, p = 0.00,  ηp2 = 0.996. Trials 
with higher overall stimulus strength (M = 2.6425, SD = 0.9883) resulted in higher confidence 
ratings compared to trials with lower overall stimulus strength (M = 2.4965, SD = 0.9916). 
There was a significant main effect of the level of the overall strength of the stimulus on 
the accuracy rates, F(1,14) = 22.99, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.621. Trials with higher overall stimulus 
strength (M = 0.7271, SD = 0.4455) resulted in higher accuracy rates compared to trials with 
lower overall stimulus strength (M = 0.714, SD = 0.452). 
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis was that the increased difference between dominant color strength 
and secondary color strength would cause increased confidence ratings. There was a significant 
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main effect of the level of the dominant-secondary strength difference on the confidence rating, 
F(1, 14) = 1087.8, p = 0.00,  ηp2 = 0.987. Trials with higher difference between dominant and 
secondary color strengths (M = 2.6147, SD = 0.9939) resulted in higher confidence ratings 
compared to trials with lower difference in dominant-secondary color strengths  (M = 2.5243, SD 
= 0.9893). 
There was a significant main effect of the level of the dominant-secondary strength 
difference on the accuracy rates, F(1, 14) = 6707, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.998. Trials with higher 
difference between dominant and secondary color strengths (M = 0.788, SD = 0.409) resulted in 
higher accuracy rates compared to trials with lower difference in dominant-secondary color 
strengths  (M = 0.654, SD = 0.476). 
Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis was that the increased difference between dominant color strength 
and tertiary color strength would cause increased confidence ratings. There was a significant 
main effect of the level of the dominant-tertiary strength difference on the confidence rating, F(2, 
28) = 535.04, p = 0.00,  ηp2 = 0.975. Trials with higher difference between dominant and tertiary 
color strengths (M = 2.6858, SD = 0.9748) resulted in higher confidence ratings compared to 
trials with lower difference in dominant-tertiary color strengths  (M = 2.4553, SD = 1.0027) or 
medium difference in dominant-tertiary color strengths  (M = 2.5674, SD = 0.9869). 
There was a significant main effect of the level of the dominant-tertiary strength 
difference on the accuracy rate, F(2, 28) = 298.9, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.955. Trials with higher 
difference between dominant and tertiary color strengths (M = 0.758, SD = 0.429) resulted in 
higher confidence ratings compared to trials with lower difference in dominant-tertiary color 
DocuSign Envelope ID: 3450C2E7-FD23-4551-B69A-3AA841B6FE25
MULTIPLE-ALTERNATIVES ON CONFIDENCE-DECISION TASKS                       
20 
strengths  (M = 0.672, SD = 0.470) or medium difference in dominant-tertiary color strengths  
(M = 0.733, SD = 0.443). 
Hypothesis 4 
The fourth hypothesis was that the overall strength, the difference between dominant and 
secondary color strength, and the difference between dominant and tertiary color strength would 
interact to modulate the confidence ratings so that higher levels of each variable would cause 
higher confidence ratings. There was a significant interaction between overall stimulus strength 
and dominant-secondary strength difference on the confidence in the decision, F(1, 14) = 20.339, 
p = 0.0004, ηp2 = 0.593. There was a significant interaction between overall stimulus strength 
and dominant-tertiary strength difference, F(2, 28) = 10.614, p = 0.0008,  ηp2 = 0.433. There 
was also a significant interaction between dominant-secondary strength difference and dominant-
tertiary strength difference, F(2, 28) = 8.231, p = 0.0102, ηp2 = 0.370. Finally, there was a 
significant interaction between overall stimulus strength, dominant-secondary strength 
difference, and dominant-tertiary strength difference together, F(2, 28) = 11.751, p = 0.0025,  
ηp2 = 0.457. Varying levels of overall stimulus strength, dominant-secondary strength 
difference, and dominant-tertiary strength difference did interact significantly with respect to 
confidence, as seen in Figure 2 below. 
There was no significant interaction between overall stimulus strength and dominant-
secondary strength difference on accuracy of the decision, F(1, 14) = 4.0585, p = 0.0636, ηp2 = 
0.224. There was a significant interaction between overall stimulus strength and dominant-
tertiary strength difference, F(2, 28) = 4.3719, p = 0.0449, ηp2 = 0.235. There was a significant 
interaction between dominant-secondary strength difference and dominant-tertiary strength 
difference, F(2, 28) = 16.9136, p = 0.00, ηp2 = 0.548. Finally, there was no significant 
DocuSign Envelope ID: 3450C2E7-FD23-4551-B69A-3AA841B6FE25
MULTIPLE-ALTERNATIVES ON CONFIDENCE-DECISION TASKS                       
21 
interaction between overall stimulus strength, dominant-secondary strength difference, and 
dominant-tertiary strength difference together, F(2, 28) = < 1, p = 0.6901, ηp2 = 0.019. Varying 
levels of overall stimulus strength, dominant-secondary strength difference, and dominant-




Interactive Effects of Information Strength: Mean Confidence Rating and Standard Deviations of 
Each Condition 
 
Note. Conditions 1-12 are displayed in groups of three to compare differences in 
confidence for the three variables of overall strength, dominant-secondary strength, and 
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dominant-tertiary strength. Each interaction between each variable was significant; this 
suggests that the main effects of each variable on confidence also interact with each other 
to create an interaction effect on confidence. This is demonstrated by condition 4 having a 
higher confidence than condition 1, condition 5, and condition 10.  
 
Figure 3. 
Interactive Effects of Information Strength: Mean Accuracy Rate and Standard Deviations of 
Each Condition 
 
Note. Conditions 1-12 are displayed in groups of three to compare differences in accuracy 
for the three variables of overall strength, dominant-secondary strength, and dominant-
tertiary strength. There were only significant interactions between overall strength and 
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dominant-tertiary strength and more significantly between dominant-secondary strength 
and dominant-tertiary strength. This is demonstrated by a larger difference between 




Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 were supported by the data collected because significant main 
effects were found in the overall stimulus strength, dominant-secondary strength difference, and 
dominant-tertiary strength difference and their positive correlation with confidence ratings. 
There was a significant positive correlation between overall stimulus strength and participants’ 
confidence ratings. There was a significant positive correlation between dominant-secondary 
color strength differences and participants’ confidence ratings. There was a significant positive 
correlation between dominant-tertiary color strength differences and participants’ confidence 
ratings. Hypothesis 4 was supported by the data collected because there were significant positive 
interactive effects found in the overall stimulus strength, dominant-secondary strength 
difference, and dominant-tertiary strength difference on confidence ratings. 
Theoretical Implications 
Previous literature focuses on the effect of irrelevant information strength on the 
confidence and accuracy on tasks involving relevant perceptual information. In these studies, 
irrelevant stimuli had a positive relationship with confidence and no strong relationship with 
accuracy. However, these studies did not indicate the effects of relevant stimuli on confidence or 
accuracy. This study’s results could be interpreted through two features in regard to information 
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strength. First, overall stimulus strength had more effect on confidence than accuracy, so that 
more overall stimulus resulted in higher confidence. Second, the difference between the 
information strength for the two most prominent colors had a large effect on accuracy, so that a 
larger difference resulted in higher accuracy.  
From this, two interpretations arise. Either the relevant stimuli have a positive 
relationship with accuracy or with confidence. If relevant stimuli are interpreted as the primary 
color through the difference between primary and secondary color information strength, then it 
results in the greatest change of accuracy compared to the other two independent variables. If 
relevant stimuli are interpreted as all stimuli through the overall stimulus strength, then it results 
in the greatest change of confidence compared to the other two independent variables. 
Understanding what the brain determines relevant or irrelevant in a multiple-alternative forced 
choice task will define the way computational models distinguish the confidence process. This 
also features in comparing the Bayesian holistic probability of events and Li and Ma’s 
differential probability model (Zylberberg et al., 2014; Li & Ma, 2020). The results of this study 
indicate that both models may represent the data, but the effect sizes of the difference between 
primary and secondary colors on accuracy suggest that the differential probability model is more 
likely to represent confidence data in perceptual decision making tasks. 
Strengths and Limitations 
 This study featured many developments in the field of perceptual decision making. It 
established a three alternative forced choice (3AFC) task unique to the field, and it demonstrated 
significant effects with strong effect sizes across conditions. The study features an experimental 
study with exploratory methods to develop the groundwork for future experiments and models.  
DocuSign Envelope ID: 3450C2E7-FD23-4551-B69A-3AA841B6FE25
MULTIPLE-ALTERNATIVES ON CONFIDENCE-DECISION TASKS                       
25 
 However, the study is also limited in many features. One limitation is found in the 
descriptive statistics, where there was a significant difference in accuracy between blue and the 
other colors, which may have interacted with the results. In terms of wavelength, blue light is 
about 430nm, while red and green light are closer at about 570nm and 540nm, respectively; 
additionally, of the three photoreceptors within the retina, less than 10% are s-cones, or the 
neurons that process short wavelengths of light like the color blue (Calkins, 2001). These color 
values for red, green, and blue have all been used in perceptual research without any indication 
of significant differences; however, if previous designs did not compare only these three colors, 
and in terms of accuracy in a similar perceptual task, this distinction between blue and the other 
two colors may not have been established. Additionally, there was no significant difference in 
confidence between blue and the other colors. This could indicate that the metacognitive process 
of confidence overcompensates an individual’s perspective on their ability to accurate perceive 
blue. In order to confirm this result is representative of the population’s perceptual accuracy 
between the three primary colors of light, this aspect of the experiment should be replicated. 
This study also did not progress to a computational model, but the design allows for 
future experiments to explore the implications of increments of variance, not just levels. Finally, 
the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the research process, resulting in only 15 participants 
completing the full study and limited the time to establish a computational model within this 
specific study. This research creates an opportunity to investigate variance. 
Future Research 
 Future research has many avenues to build off of this experiment. First, future studies 
might replicate this experiment with more participants to ensure a real representation of the 
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population. Next, a probabilistic, normative computational model should be created, based off of 
posterior probability distributions, and then directly compared to the typical Bayesian confidence 
model and the Li and Ma difference model (Zylberberg et al., 2014; Li & Ma, 2020). In order to 
further investigate how the brain establishes stimuli as relevant or irrelevant in a perceptual 
decision making task, future studies should replicate this experiment with definitively irrelevant 
stimuli to compare to the overall stimulus strength and differential strengths in terms of effect on 
confidence and accuracy. Finally, more perceptual decision making studies should be conducted 
with 3AFC tasks, including previous studies in the literature. 
Conclusion 
The results of this study indicate that the difference between the two most prominent 
alternatives’ information strengths is the most relevant factor for the metacognitive process of 
confidence in perceptual decision making. The overall strength and the difference between the 
primary and tertiary alternatives also have strong effects on confidence and should be factored in 
for future computational models. This may help in developing effective resources for situations 
with multiple choices to help workers choose the correct choice with the most confidence. 
Ultimately, this research on multiple alternatives in perceptual decision making tasks differs 
largely from the assumptions in the field about the confidence process, either in the statistical 
representations or in the assumptions on what constitutes relevant stimuli in an environment. 
Further investigation of these components must be conducted before the creation of 
computational models in order to establish the psychological process of confidence in applicable 
theory rather than idealized philosophy.  
DocuSign Envelope ID: 3450C2E7-FD23-4551-B69A-3AA841B6FE25
MULTIPLE-ALTERNATIVES ON CONFIDENCE-DECISION TASKS                       
27 
References 
Boldt, A., de Gardelle, V., & Yeung, N. (2017). The impact of evidence reliability on sensitivity 
and bias in decision confidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 43(8), 1520-1531. doi:10.1037/xhp0000404. 
Calkins, D. J. (2001). Seeing with S cones. Progress in retinal and eye research, 20(3), 255-287. 
doi:10.1016/S1350-9462(00)00026-4 
de Gardelle, V., & Mamassian, P. (2015). Weighting mean and variability during confidence 
judgments. PloS one, 10(3). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120870 
De Bondt, W. F., & Thaler, R. H. (1990). Do security analysts overreact?. The American 
Economic Review, 52-57. 
Desender, K., Boldt, A., & Yeung, N. (2018). Subjective confidence predicts information 
seeking in decision making. Psychological science, 29(5), 761-778. 
doi:10.1177/0956797617744771 
Ferrigno, S., Kornell, N., & Cantlon, J. F. (2017). A metacognitive illusion in monkeys. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 284(1862), 20171541. 
doi:10.1098/rspb.2017.1541 
Kiani, R., Corthell, L., & Shadlen, M. N. (2014). Choice certainty is informed by both evidence 
and decision time. Neuron, 84(6), 1329-1342. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2014.12.015. 
Koizumi, A., Maniscalco, B., & Lau, H. (2015). Does perceptual confidence facilitate cognitive 
control?.Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 77(4), 1295-1306. doi:10.3758/s13414-
015-0843-3 
DocuSign Envelope ID: 3450C2E7-FD23-4551-B69A-3AA841B6FE25
MULTIPLE-ALTERNATIVES ON CONFIDENCE-DECISION TASKS                       
28 
Li, H. H., & Ma, W. J. (2020). Confidence reports in decision-making with multiple alternatives 
violate the Bayesian confidence hypothesis. Nature Communications, 11(1), 1-11. doi:  
10.1038/s41467-020-15581-6 
Meyniel, F., Sigman, M., & Mainen, Z. F. (2015). Confidence as Bayesian probability: From 
neural origins to behavior. Neuron, 88(1), 78-92. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2015.09.039 
Samaha, J., Barrett, J. J., Sheldon, A. D., LaRocque, J. J., & Postle, B. R. (2016). Dissociating 
perceptual confidence from discrimination accuracy reveals no influence of 
metacognitive awareness on working memory. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 851. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00851 
Sanders, J. I., Hangya, B., & Kepecs, A. (2016). Signatures of a statistical computation in the 
human sense of confidence. Neuron, 90(3), 499-506. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2016.03.025 
Spence, M. L., Dux, P. E., & Arnold, D. H. (2016). Computations underlying confidence in 
visual perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 42(5), 671. doi:10.1037/xhp0000179 
Spence, M. L., Mattingley, J. B., & Dux, P. E. (2018). Uncertainty information that is irrelevant 
for report impacts confidence judgments. Journal of experimental psychology: human 
perception and performance, 44(12), 1981. doi:10.1037/xhp0000584 
Vlassova, A., Donkin, C., & Pearson, J. (2014). Unconscious information changes decision 
accuracy but not confidence. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(45), 
16214-16218. doi:10.1073/pnas.1403619111 
Zylberberg, A., Fetsch, C. R., & Shadlen, M. N. (2016). The influence of evidence volatility on 
choice, reaction time and confidence in a perceptual decision. Elife, 5, e17688. 
doi:10.7554/eLife.17688 
DocuSign Envelope ID: 3450C2E7-FD23-4551-B69A-3AA841B6FE25
MULTIPLE-ALTERNATIVES ON CONFIDENCE-DECISION TASKS                       
29 
Zylberberg, A., Roelfsema, P. R., & Sigman, M. (2014). Variance misperception explains 
illusions of confidence in simple perceptual decisions. Consciousness and cognition, 27, 
246-253. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.05.012 
DocuSign Envelope ID: 3450C2E7-FD23-4551-B69A-3AA841B6FE25
